shows the consolidated average wait time for access to new medicines in Canada, broken down by each of the two segments described above. This wait time is measured in days and is presented as a weighted average for
Total delay
Adding together the wait times from the first and second segments discussed above, the total average wait for patients dependent on public drug programs for insured access to new medicines was 704 days (1.9 years) in 2008. The total average wait has significantly decreased from an average of 1,487 days (approximately 4.1 years) in 2004. While this represents an improvement, overall waits for access to new medicines remain significant. One underappreciated consequence of this delay is that in the meantime, patients are not experiencing the potential health benefits that may result from earlier access to innovative new drug treatments.
Access denied
Despite improvements in the speed at which decisions are made about national and provincial drug approvals, most of the drugs that are approved by Health Canada as safe and effective are not declared eligible for reimbursement under provincial drug plans. Averaged across all provincial public drug programs, as of December 31, 2009, only 
Introduction
This annual report provides patients with some of the information they need to determine whether the time they wait for access to new medicines in Canada is unnecessarily long, and whether publicly funded and managed drug insurance programs provide adequate benefits and choice for patients. We hope that this report will encourage policy makers to consider policy alternatives that empower consumers with greater choice. This report focuses on new patented medicines because this class of drugs is uniquely affected by public policies that delay access for patients. Because government approval of generic drugs is based on the assumption that generics are copies of new drugs that have previously been approved, there is no substantive delay (observed or expected) before the public has access to generic products; consequently, this class of drugs is not studied in this report.
Global factors affecting access to new medicines
It takes a long time to develop a new drug. The development period for new drugs is measured from the patented discovery of a new drug molecule to the first time an application is submitted for marketing approval anywhere in the world. Governments around the world regulate drugs to ensure the safety of the product. For example, Health Canada has a national mandate to ensure the safety of all drugs sold in Canada and thus it regulates which products are allowed to be sold and under what conditions. Health Canada approves new pharmaceutical medicines through the Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD) and approves new biological medicines through the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate (BGTD). Canadian regulations fall under the 1985 Food and Drugs Act. In order to obtain marketing approval for a drug, manufacturers must provide Health Canada with evidence of its successful clinical testing. The longest period within the drug-development phase involves clinical testing of a new medicine on volunteer patients. Clinical testing of new drugs involves thousands of patients who are often located across international jurisdictions and monitored over many years. No drug is submitted for marketing approval anywhere in the developed world without having first completed successful clinical tests.
The cost of, and time spent in, the development of new drugs is affected by universal scientific standards of experimental research. These standards determine, for example, how many patients must be enrolled in the testing of a new drug in order for researchers to have confidence in the statistical results and conclusions. There are also scientific standards for the design and conduct of clinical drug testing in patient populations, as well as ethical standards with respect to the treatment and use of human and animal subjects. These standards have international acceptance and affect the absolute minimum period of time it takes to complete clinical testing of the safety and effectiveness of any new medicine. International scientific standards for clinical trials are established by the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 1964) . These are generally interpreted as the minimum global standard. In practice, actual standards for demonstrating the safety of drug products are set by national governments through domestic regulation. These standards determine the number, length, and rigor of the required clinical trials. For instance, Health Canada's regulations require minimum compliance with international standards for clinical research on new medicines, but do not exclude stricter regulations as deemed necessary by the government of Canada (Health Canada, 2006a) . Nevertheless, because of the importance of the American and European markets throughout the world, the actual minimum time spent during drug development is determined by the clinical testing time necessary to satisfy the requirements of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMEA).
The most recent research indicates that, on a global basis, the process of developing a new drug takes, on average, about 10 years (DiMasi, 2001; DiMasi et al., 1995 DiMasi et al., , 2003 Adams and Brantner, 2006) . The process is measured from the time a drug discovery is patented to the time an application for FDA marketing approval is made (table 1) . Moreover, this lengthy development process comes with a steep price. The cost of developing a new patented prescription drug ranges from $521 million to $2,119 million, depending on the company and the drug. The average cost is $868 million (above figures adjusted to 2000 US dollars) (DiMasi, 2001; DiMasi et al., 1995 DiMasi et al., , 2003 Brantner, 2003, 2006) .
For the purposes of this report, the global development time for new medicines is assumed to be a function of factors outside of Canada's control; therefore, the time associated with this segment is presented for completeness but is not the focus of the main policy discussion in this paper, nor is it part of the overall wait time for access to new medicines measured here. This paper is primarily concerned with government policies that contribute to an unnecessary delay in access to new medicines after the lengthy period of time it takes to develop them in the first place. 
Delays caused by the federal government
After the development phase is over, the first segment of the wait for new medicines that is affected by public policies and institutional performance in Canada is the wait for the federal government to approve the safety and effectiveness of new drugs. Before any new drug is legally allowed to be sold in Canada, it must first receive official approval from Health Canada. Health Canada reviews published clinical research conducted on new drugs before it certifies that a drug is safe for sale in Canada and that the drug's effectiveness has been scientifically demonstrated. 
Drug approval times in Canada and the European Union, 2006-2008
The Canadian data presented here are different from the Canadian data shown in the previous section because the data in the previous section are weighted by biologic and pharmaceutical drug type. Unfortunately, the EMEA data available for this study were not detailed enough to permit the calculation of an average that is weighted by drug type. To make the Canadian and European data comparable, the data for Health Canada and the EMEA are shown as non-weighted, consolidated averages across biologic and pharmaceutical drug types. 
Drug approval times in Canada and the United States, 2004-2008
The Canadian data presented here are different from the previous sections because they are based on a different method of aggregating the statistics. In the previous sections, the statistics were aggregated on the basis of averages. However, the United States (FDA) only publishes median figures for drug approval times. Fortunately, Health Canada also publishes median figures, making comparisons to the US data possible. The data for both Canada and the United States are detailed enough to permit a calculation of a weighted average of the medians according to drug submission category (priority or non-priority). However, the US data does not allow weighting by drug Sources: Health Canada, 2009a , 2010 EMEA, 2007 EMEA, , 2008 EMEA, , 2009 ; calculations by authors.
type (biologic or pharmaceutical). Figure 4 
Delays caused by provincial governments
The second segment of the wait for new medicines that is affected by government policies and institutional performance is the time spent by the federal,1 provincial, and territorial (FPT) governments to decide whether to reimburse a new drug under their respective publicly funded drug insurance programs. Each jurisdiction determines reimbursement eligibility through its own government agency; consequently, the wait time for access to new medicines differs by jurisdiction. This wait is measured from the date on which Health Canada issues a Notice of Compliance (NOC) for a new drug to the date on which the first public reimbursement (PR) of the same drug is recorded in the formularies of each federal, provincial, and territorial drug program.
Provincial reimbursement delays, 2004-2008
FPT authorities have three options when determining reimbursement eligibility under public drug plans. First, they can declare a drug ineligible for public reimbursement. Second, they can declare a drug eligible for full reimbursement without conditions. Third, they can declare a new medicine eligible for reimbursement with restrictions. The analysis presented here considers any type of approval (full or restricted) to be an approval for the purpose of measuring and comparing performance between jurisdictions. The analysis does not present data on reimbursement delays for federal or territorial government drug programs. This analysis is focused only on the performance of provincial drug plans. 
Total delay for access to new medicines
An estimate of the total time spent waiting for access to new medicines after they have been developed can be calculated by adding the time taken by Health Canada to issue a safety approval (CR to NOC) and the provincial reimbursement delay (NOC to PR). Figure 6 shows the consolidated average wait for access to new medicines, measured in days, for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 . Reading left to right: the first segment of the bar represents the time needed for Health Canada to certify that new drugs are safe and effective before allowing patients to use them. This segment of the wait for access to new medicines affects all patients in Canada equally, whether they pay for their drugs through private insurance, out-of-pocket expenditure, or public drug programs. Only improving the efficiency and capacity of Health Canada to conduct new drug reviews can reduce the time spent in approval. The length of time taken by Health Canada to grant marketing approval for new medicines has decreased over the last five years (figure 6). The second segment of the bar represents the period of waiting for those who are dependent on public drug programs. As figure 6 shows, the time spent by the provinces to grant eligibility for the public reimbursement of new drugs decreased over the five-year period.
The total average wait for publicly insured access to new medicines approved by Health Canada in 2004 was 1,487 days (4.1 years); compared to 1,369 days (3.8 years) for drugs approved for sale in 2005; 1,095 days (approximately 3 years) for drugs that were granted market authorization in 2006; 937 days (approximately 2.6 years) for drugs that received a NOC in 2007; and 704 days (1.9 years) for drugs approved for sale in 2008. Nevertheless, wait times for these drugs remain significant. 
Denials of reimbursement by provincial governments
It is important to examine provincial reimbursements, not just in terms of delays, but also in terms of denials of access. Although most provinces have reduced the number of days that patients must wait to have new drugs publicly reimbursed, this does not necessarily mean that the overall percentage of drugs that eventually become eligible for reimbursement has remained the same. Provincial agencies could be taking less time to review and grant reimbursement approval for new drugs because fewer drugs are ultimately being accepted for reimbursement. Reimbursement approval rates are estimated by calculating the number of full or partial reimbursement approvals recorded in each province (as of December 31, 2009) Note: Provinces often take more than a year to decide whether or not to make a new drug eligible for public reimbursement. Therefore, more new drugs that were approved by Health Canada in the observed years could eventually be granted eligibility for public reimbursement in the future. The delay will be captured in future reports and will be reflected in the percentages shown above Tables 3a and 3b also show the difference in reimbursement delays (in days) between public and private drug-insurance plans. As above mentioned, the difference in delays is based on the first date on which a specific drug was listed on any provincial formulary (public drug plan) and the first date on which a reimbursement claim was made by any private insurer across Canada. As Canada, 2002) . Figure 7 displays the difference in days between the first claim that was made with a private insurance plan and the first listing of the drug with a public insurance plan (aggregated across provinces) for all drugs (pharmaceutical and biological) that have been approved for reimbursement by at least one public and private drug insurance plan as of December 31, 2009. In some extreme cases, such as the biological drug Forteo, the difference in reimbursement approval between public and private drug insurance was over 1,800 days. In general, the data indicate that private drug insurance (at least one insurer) listed new drugs that were approved by Health Canada in 2004 much earlier than any provincial public drug plan (with the exception of Multihance and Tiazac XC). 
First listing with public drug insurance First claim with private drug insurance

Conclusions
• In total, Canadians wait nearly two years (on average) for access to publicly insured drugs.
• Health Canada's approval times have improved since 2004, relative to the agency's own performance.
• Health Canada's performance was worse than that of the European EMEA in all three years studied (2006, 2007 and 2008) .
• Health Canada's performance was worse than that of the American FDA in four of the last five years studied (2004 to 2008).
• Only a small percentage of the new drugs that Health Canada certifies as safe and effective are finally declared eligible for reimbursement under provincial public drug programs.
• The provincial governments take a significant amount of time to approve the few drugs that they declare eligible for public reimbursement.
• Private drug insurance in Canada covers significantly more new drugs than public drug insurance.
• Private drug insurance in Canada covers new drugs more rapidly than public drug insurance.
Policy options-improving access to new drugs Mutual recognition of drug approvals and cooperation with other jurisdictions
Health Canada essentially duplicates the new drug approval process of the FDA in the United States. Canada could speed up its regulatory process by taking advantage of the regulatory knowledge and capacity of other jurisdictions, rather than attempting to duplicate the American process. A consolidation of resources through the sharing of data, workload, and processes would be of great benefit to all participating countries. For example, if Canada entered into agreements of "mutual recognition" with other countries, new medications already approved in those countries could be introduced into the Canadian market far more rapidly and vice versa. In an effort to reduce the time taken to review new medications, Canada's recent Smart Regulation strategy proposed a form of mutual recognition to reduce persistent delays in the drug approval process (EACSR, 2004) . Similar thinking is reflected in the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). In the 1980's, the European Community (the predecessor of the European Union) initiated discussions to develop a single market for pharmaceuticals. During this time, bilateral discussions between Europe, Japan and the United States (representing over 80% of the world's pharmaceutical market) were also taking place about harmonizing the approval process for new medicines. Although the regulatory agencies of Europe, Japan and the United States all had the same central objective of evaluating the quality, efficacy, and safety of new medicinal products, they found it necessary to duplicate many expensive and time-consuming tests before granting market authorization in their respective countries. However, this became inefficient as the cost of research and development (for new drugs) and health care costs in general increased significantly over time, and patients did not have access to the newest medicinal products that were available in other countries (ICH, 2009 ). Thus, the intention of the international conference on harmonization (ICH) was to establish international technical requirements and guidelines for increasing the efficiency of the drug development process by reducing unnecessary duplications (thus reducing costs), while also accelerating the market approval so that new medicinal products were made available to patients as soon as possible (ICH, 2009 ).
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
The ICH is made up of six parties representing industry associations (brandname drug companies only) and regulatory agencies of the United States, Japan, and Europe; and Observers, which include the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Health Canada, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Although the observers do not vote on issues, they are present at all conferences and contribute to regulatory consultations. In addition, the Observers act as a link to non-ICH countries and regions (ICH, 2009) .
Since its inception, the ICH has developed over 50 harmonized guidelines. The guidelines are intended to eliminate duplication in the drug development and marketing approval process, with the goal that a single set of studies can be produced to show the "quality, safety, and efficacy of a new medicinal product" (ICH, 2009). For instance, under the guidelines, a Common Technical Document (CTD) has been established so that a common application is used for medicinal product submissions to all member regulatory authorities (ICH, 2009) .
Importantly, the guidelines are meant to be followed within the standards determined by regional requirements. In general, the guidelines are used by the drug industry as a way of reducing duplication by using a single set of data and universal application to show safety and efficacy, and to apply for licensing (ICH, 2009) . ICH guidelines range from the amount of animal testing required during clinical trials to post-marketing safety data.
Although the ICH reduces duplication and costs, a drug must still be approved by the regulatory agency of each member and observer country. In other words, a drug approved by the EMEA (in the European Union) must still be submitted for approval to the FDA if a drug manufacturer would like the drug sold in the United States.
Although Health Canada is an Observer at the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) and has implemented a number of guidelines established by the ICH, it still lags behind its international counterparts on harmonization efforts.
Replace government drug programs with subsidized access to private insurance
Data presented in this study indicate that private drug insurance in Canada tends to cover a wider range of new medicines and approves their coverage at a much faster rate than public drugs programs. One way to improve access to new medicines without increasing the burden on taxpayers would be to replace existing public drug plans with a properly regulated and competitive private-sector insurance market in which universal access to catastrophic drug insurance would be facilitated through means-tested subsidies for those with low incomes. Economic theory and evidence, and actual Canadian experience, suggest that such a policy alternative would be expected to achieve universal access to prescription drug coverage and would contain costs, without restricting consumer choice through central planning.
Research suggests that private-payment health systems (a combination of private insurance and out-of-pocket spending) are better structured to encourage the efficient demand for, and supply of, health technology (cf. Danzon, 1993; Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993) . By creating a price at the point of consumption, co-payments encourage patients to make cost-efficient choices between alternative treatments (e.g., invasive surgery, non-invasive surgery, prescription drugs, natural remedies). Consumer sensitivity to prices in turn creates incentives for health-care providers to supply and use resources efficiently. This creates incentives for drug manufacturers to invest efficiently in the development of new drugs. It is also common for private-sector insurers to employ deductibles that appropriately restrict insurance coverage to a range of expenses considered individually unaffordable for consumers. Private-sector insurers sometimes impose annual coverage limits that might expose patients to significant cash costs in unusual cases involving very expensive drugs. Yet, in a competitive private-sector insurance market where individuals buy insurance directly, patients who prefer higher insurance coverage limits can opt to pay higher premiums to cover the risk of such extraordinary expenses. Under a system with means-tested subsidies for those with low incomes, maximum coverage limits for subsidized populations would have to be determined through public decision-making processes.
Importantly, it is essential that recipients are means-tested before qualifying for public subsidies. A historic feature of provincial drug-benefit programs in Canada is preferential treatment based on age (Graham and Tabler, 2005) . Although some provinces have introduced means-testing in accordance with age-based eligibility, other provinces grant automatic eligibility for publicly funded drug programs once their citizens turn 65 years of age. For instance, in Ontario, seniors with a valid Ontario health card do not need to apply for publicly funded drug coverage: residents of Ontario aged 65 and older simply take their prescriptions to a pharmacy and inform the pharmacist that they are eligible for the Ontario Drug Benefit Program [ODB] (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2002) . Even though the ODB requires seniors to contribute through minimal co-payments (a maximum of $6.11 and a minimum of $2 per prescription) and annual deductibles (a maximum of $100 per person for a couple with a combined income of $24,175 or more), research shows that very few seniors (and the entire population more generally) actually experience catastrophic drug costs or lack the financial means to pay for it themselves. Skinner found that between 1997 and 2002, only 3% of Canadian households spent more than 5% of their annual income on prescription drugs (Skinner, 2005) . Likewise, the Romanow Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada concluded that, in 2002, only 3% of the general population in the province of Manitoba exceeded the catastrophic threshold of $1,500 (Romanow, 2002) . Looking at seniors more specifically, a more recent analysis of the province of Saskatchewan shows that, in 2006, elderly families (65 years of age or older) only spent 1.4% of their median after-tax income on prescription drugs (Rovere, 2008) . In other words, a very small percentage of seniors (or the general population) actually experience catastrophic drug costs.
Therefore, instead of automatically providing comprehensive public drug insurance to people based on age, means-tested subsidies should be provided to those with low incomes regardless of age to purchase catastrophic drug insurance in a private, competitive, insurance market. This would benefit recipients by giving them the choice of selecting the drug plan that meets their individual medical needs and financial abilities, while providing significant savings to taxpayers. Research shows that this approach could save taxpayers more than CA$4 billion (2005 dollars) annually (Skinner, 2005) . Allowing the private insurance market to compete through price and service, thus eliminating government monopolies on drug prices and coverage (Skinner and Rovere, 2008b ) is the best policy choice for improving access to the newest prescription drugs.
Appendix-classes, data sources, and comparability
Data sources and comparability issues
There are four main sources of data cited in this report. The first source is Health Canada, which is the only source of data on drug safety approval times in Canada that comprehensively includes all drugs.1 Health Canada publishes data on pharmaceutical medicines through the Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD) and on biologic medicines through the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate (BGTD). Data published in annual reports on drug approvals by the TPD and the BGTD are stated in aggregates and are not broken down in detail. Health Canada publishes this data separately by drug submission class, priority (or "fast track") review status, and therapeutic category. Health Canada's published approval times include the entire period between the original filing of the new drug submission application (CR) and the issuance of the Notice of Compliance (NOC), inclusive of all company time spent to address any deficiencies in the manufacturer's application. It is unclear whether Health Canada records the filing of a new drug submission application on the actual date it was delivered to the TPD or the date on which a reviewer first saw the file (Health Canada, 2001 , 2003 , 2004a , b, 2005a , b, c, 2006a , b, c, 2007 . The two sources of international comparative data on drug safety approval times cited are the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration (US FDA, 1996 , 2002 and the European Medicines Agency (EMEA, 2005 (EMEA, , 2007 (EMEA, , 2008 (EMEA, , 2009 . The FDA and the EMEA publish separate data for the time spent by 1 Another public source of aggregated Canadian and international data on drug approval times is the industry association, Rx&D, which represents the makers of new drugs otherwise known as brand-name pharmaceutical companies. Rx&D conducts an annual survey of its member companies (representing most but not all of the industry) to collect data on their actual experience with government approval times for a defined basket of drug products (i.e., new drug submissions, supplemental drug submissions, and clinical trial applications) (Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, 2005) .
companies to correct the deficiencies in their applications. Health Canada does not do so; instead, it publishes an entire approval delay that includes what they call "company" time. In order to make the data comparable among countries, "company" time was included in the total approval delay for the FDA and the EMEA. In previous years Health Canada published both average and median figures for drug approval wait times. However in this year's annual reports, Health Canada published only median figures. A special data request was made to Health Canada to obtain average approval times in order to compare wait times between Canada and the European Union. The FDA only publishes median figures. The EMEA only publishes average figures. As a result, Canadian and European data were compared using averages, while Canadian and American data were compared using medians. Unlike Health Canada and the FDA, the EMEA does not publish approval wait-time data that separates priority and non-priority new drug submissions.
In the US data, drug types (pharmaceutical and biological medicines) are aggregated but the data is separated by submission status type (priority or non-priority review). The Canadian figures published by Health Canada are separated according to submission status type (priority or non-priority review); however, unlike the American data, the Canadian figures are reported separately by drug type. In order to make the two sets of data more comparable, it was necessary to aggregate the separately reported medians by calculating a weighted median proportional to the number of drugs approved in each subset as a percentage of the total number of drugs approved overall. The Health Canada data is weighted by drug type (biological and pharmaceutical drugs) and by submission status type (priority and non-priority). As drug types are already consolidated by the FDA, the US data is only weighted by submission status type.
The fourth main source of data cited in this paper is Brogan Inc. (Brogan Inc., 2009) . Brogan Inc. is a private consulting and data firm that collects information that permits the measurement of public and private reimbursement delays and the rate of positive reimbursement approvals in each of the provinces. Brogan Inc. 's database contains the date on which Health Canada issued a NOC for each new drug and the first date on which public reimbursement of a drug was approved in each of the provinces, as well as a classification of whether reimbursement was full, restricted, or declined. The database also provides the first date on which a paid claim for a new drug was registered for private insurers; however it does not provide the name of the private insurer. Using this database, comparisons can be measured between the date on which the private and public drug insurance plans approve a drug for reimbursement after it has received market authorization by Health Canada.
Canadian and international definitions of classes for new drug submissions
In Canada, new drugs fall under different classifications defined by Health Canada's Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD) and the Biologics and Genetic Therapies Directorate (BGTD). In Canada, non-generic new drug approvals involve new active substances (NAS), new drug submissions (NDS), and supplemental new drug submissions (SNDS). Similar classifications are used by the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) but under different terminology. The Canadian and international classifications are briefly described in the following tables. 
New Active Substance (NAS)
A New Active Substance is a therapeutic substance that has never before been approved for marketing in any form; a chemical or biological substance not previously approved for sale in Canada as a drug; an isomer, derivative, or salt of a chemical substance previously approved for sale as a drug in Canada but differing in properties with regard to safety and efficacy; and a biological substance previously approved for sale in Canada as a drug but differing in molecular structure, nature of the source material, or manufacturing process.
New Drug Submission (NDS)
New Drug Submission includes all NASs, as well as combinations of previously approved NASs, and any drug that has not been sold in Canada for sufficient time and in sufficient quantity to establish its safety and effectiveness under use or its recommended conditions for use.
Supplemental NDS (SNDS)
A Supplemental NDS (SNDS) must be filed by the manufacturer if certain changes are made to products that have already been authorized. Such changes might include the dosage form or strength of the drug product, the formulation, method of manufacture, labeling, or recommended route of administration. An SNDS must also be submitted if a manufacturer wants to expand the indications (claims or conditions of use) for the drug product.
Abbreviated NDS (ANDS)
An Abbreviated NDS (ANDS) must be filed by a manufacturer wishing approval of a substance that is not a new drug but a generic "copy" of a drug that has been previously approved for sale in Canada.
Priority or Non-Priority review status
Priority review status is a "fast-track" status granted to eligible new drug submissions for human use, following review and approval of a request submitted by the manufacturer of the drug. Priority review status assigns eligible submissions a shortened review target of 180 days, in comparison to 300 days for submissions classed as non-priority. Health Canada believes it is in the best interest of Canadians to review potentially life-saving drugs as early as possible. Priority review status may be granted to drug submissions intended for the treatment, prevention, or diagnosis of serious, life-threatening, or severely debilitating illnesses or conditions where (a) there is no existing drug on the Canadian market with the same profile, or (b) the new product has a benefit/risk profile that is a significant improvement over the profile of existing products. 
New Molecular Entity (NME)
A New Molecular Entity is an active ingredient that has never before been marketed in the United States in any form.
New Drug Application (NDA)
When the sponsor of a new drug believes that enough evidence on the drug's safety and effectiveness has been obtained to meet FDA's requirements for marketing approval, the sponsor submits to FDA a new drug application (NDA). The application must contain data from specific technical viewpoints for review, including chemistry, pharmacology, medical, biopharmaceutics, and statistics. If the NDA is approved, the product may be marketed in the United States. For internal tracking purposes, all NDA's are assigned an NDA number.
Supplement
A supplement is an application to allow a company to make changes in a product that already has an approved new drug application (NDA). CDER must approve all important NDA changes (in packaging or ingredients, for instance) to ensure the conditions originally set for the product are still met.
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) Number
This six-digit number is assigned by FDA staff to each application for approval to market a generic drug in the United States.
Biologic License Application (BLA)
Biological products are approved for marketing under the provisions of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act. The Act requires a firm that manufactures a biologic for sale in interstate commerce to hold a license for the product. A biologics license application is a submission that contains specific information on the manufacturing processes, chemistry, pharmacology, clinical pharmacology, and the medical affects of the biologic product. If the information provided meets FDA requirements, the application is approved and a license is issued allowing the firm to market the product.
Review Priority Classification
The Review Priority Classification is a determination that is made based on an estimate of the therapeutic preventive or diagnostic value of the drug submitted. The designations "Priority" (P) and "Standard" (S) are mutually exclusive. Both original NDAs and effectiveness supplements receive a review priority classification but manufacturing supplements do not.
Priority review (P)
Priority review is granted when a drug product, if approved, would be a significant improvement over marketed products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease. Improvement can be demonstrated by, for example, (1) evidence of increased effectiveness in treatment, prevention, or diagnosis of disease; (2) elimination or substantial reduction of a treatment-limiting drug reaction; (3) documented enhancement of patient compliance; or (4) evidence of safety and effectiveness in a new subpopulation.
Standard review (S)
All non-priority applications will be considered standard applications.
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research's definition of priority review
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) definition of a priority review is stricter than the definition that CDER uses. The biological drug, if approved, must offer a significant improvement in the safety or effectiveness of the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a serious or lifethreatening disease.
Sources: US FDA, 1996 
New Active Substance (NAS)
A new chemical, biological, or radiopharmaceutical active substance includes:
• a chemical, biological, or radiopharmaceutical substance not previously authorized as a medicinal product in the European Union;
• an isomer, mixture of isomers, a complex or derivative or salt of a chemical substance previously authorized as a medicinal product in the European Union but differing in properties with regard to safety and efficacy from that chemical substance previously authorized;
• a biological substance previously authorized as a medicinal product in the European Union but differing in molecular structure, nature of the source material, or manufacturing process;
• a radiopharmaceutical substance, which is a radionuclide or a ligand, not previously authorized as a medicinal product in the European Union, or the coupling mechanism to link the molecule and the radionuclide that has not been authorized previously in the European Union.
Extensions
An extension of a new drug is defined according to the following:
• different salt/ester complex/derivative (with the same therapeutic moiety): evidence that there is no change in the pharmacokinetics of the moiety, pharmacodynamics, and/or in toxicity that could change the safety/efficacy profile (otherwise, to be considered as a new active substance);
• different route/pharmaceutical form (for parenteral administration, it is necessary to distinguish between intraarterial, intravenous, intramuscular, subcutaneous, and other routes): (i) new route of administration; (ii) new pharmaceutical form (same route);
• different strength, same route/pharmaceutical form and posology: bioavailability (cf. guideline);
• suprabioavailable products: (i) same dosage intervals but reduced doses intended to achieve same plasma/blood concentrations as a function of time; bioavailability studies may suffice (see paragraph 5 of Bioequivalence guideline);
• active substances associated in a different proportion/different posology or if one or more is intended for modified release.
Source: European Medicines Agency, 2005
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